Abstract: This paper tests the pollution haven hypothesis by examining the relationship between environmental regulation and foreign investment with consideration of the role of corporate social responsibility, which has so far been neglected. Using multinationals' investment data from China, our results in general support the pollution haven hypothesis that less stringent environmental regulation is more attractive for multinationals to invest in China, but high social responsibility can counteract attractiveness of weak environmental regulation.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the open-door policy, China has successfully attracted a high amount of foreign direct investment, which significantly contributes to the high economic growth rates in the past three decades (Tian and Yu, 2012) . According to the latest World Development Indicators, China received an amount of 0.43 billion US dollars of foreign direct investment in 1982, and this amount increased dramatically to 185.1 billion in 2010. In tandem with the increasing foreign investment and rapid economic growth, China has experienced severe environmental deterioration. For instance, about 90% of rivers close to cities are so severely polluted that they are unfit for drinking and fishing 1 ; and the air pollution in Chinese cities is so severe that breathing it can result in serious health consequences (Yu and Abler, 2010) . Is the coexistence of increasing foreign investment and environmental deterioration a coincidence, or is there some causal effect?
Regarding the relationship, there is a so-called pollution haven hypothesis which states that multinationals are more likely to transfer the intensely pollutive side of production to developing countries with relative low environmental standards (Sanna-Randaccio and Sestini, 2011; Sanna-Randaccio, 2012). According to the hypothesis, less stringent environmental regulations can be economically advantageous for developing countries, though it is of detriment to their environment.
In order to compete with each other for foreign investment, developing countries are encouraged to race to the bottom level of environmental standards in order to stay in the game (Copeland and Taylor, 2003) .
The core of the pollution haven hypothesis is that whether multinationals are attracted by weak environmental regulations. Research has provided evidence of a negative correlation between environmental regulation and the location choice of foreign investment (Xing and Kolstad, 2002; Zhang and Fu, 2008) . It implies that less stringent environmental regulation could increase the possibility of foreign investment in some cases, which is consistent with the pollution haven hypothesis. While some other literature could not find strong supportive evidence that the multinationals prefer investing in regions with less stringent environmental regulation (Javorcik and Wei, 2005) . Erkeland and Harrison (2003) suggest that the evidence of the pollution haven hypothesis might depend on the pollutants and industries. The mixed findings demand that more research should be done to complete the debate with consideration of more factors (Chao and Yu, 2004) . . On the contrary, for some multinationals environmental responsibility occupies priority, and they never lower their environmental standards in pursuit of a higher profit rate. A good example is Swedish furniture giant IKEA, which has set up eight environmental requirements for Chinese suppliers, and any supplier who fails to comply with these requirements faces exclusion Considering the heterogeneities of firms as mentioned above, the amount of existing research on the pollution haven hypothesis is insufficient, and the environmental responsibility for a firm should be included. This paper will take the lead in introducing corporate social responsibility of the environment to the debate of the pollution haven hypothesis to fill in the gap in the current literature. It can be expected that multinationals with high social responsibility are less likely to be attracted by weak environmental regulations, as Porter's hypothesis suggested, these multinationals can obtain a premium from the capital market and maintain a competitive advantage by establishing a high environmental standard (Porter and Linde, 1995; Wagner, 2006; . However, weak environmental regulations may provide incentives for the multinationals with low social responsibility and attract them to locate their plants there.
In order to fill in the literature gap, this paper attempts to examine the relationship between local environmental regulation and the location choices of foreign firms, specifically taking into account the role of corporate social responsibility, by using a conditional logit model and foreign firm data in China. Our results generally support the pollution haven hypothesis that less stringent environmental regulation is more attractive for multinationals to invest in China. However, corporate social responsibility also plays important roles in the hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper continues with Section 2, which provides a short literature review; Section 3 which presents the methodology and the data sources; Section 4 which gives the empirical results and discussions, and finally, Section 5 which concludes the paper.
Literature review
The debate over the Pollution Haven Hypothesis has attracted a great deal of attention from researchers in this field. There are two main strands of research which vary according to the data used. We first review the literature using macro-level data, and then review the literature using micro-level data. In the end of this section, the possible reasons for the mixed results are discussed.
At the macro-level, Xing and Kolstad (2002) find a negative relationship between US investment and the stringency of environmental regulation in host countries, by using the aggregated data from six highly pollutive US industries, they propose that lax environmental policy tends to attract more capital inflow of highly pollutive quantitative data from pollution costs will be more convincing.
In addition to the methodological problems, another possible reason is the ignorance of the firm's heterogeneity, and overemphasis of the possible competition among the developing countries. Rondinelli and Berry (2000) suggest that the accountable multinationals usually adopt strictly self-regulated activities to achieve sustainable development. However, not all multinationals behave in this way. We should shed light on firms' environmental behavior with consideration of their heterogeneities in social responsibilities. So far, little is known about whether weak environmental regulations could attract more foreign investment if taking into account the corporate social responsibility. Considering the concerns above, this study takes the lead in introducing the perspective of corporate social responsibility to the debate over the pollution haven hypothesis, and an attempt at filling in the gaps in the literature.
Methodology and data

Methodology
This study uses a conditional logit model proposed by McFadden (1974) to estimate the location choice of multinationals. The model is well grounded in microeconomic utility/profit maximization and is feasible for rich empirical specifications. Unlike aggregate methodologies, the discrete-choice models empower researchers to reveal each individual's preference, while some micro-level characteristics may be lost in the aggregate methodologies by the aggregation process of discrete data.
Our conditional logit model assumes that multinational company i would choose province j for its new plant only if this province could maximize its profits. We ignore the characteristics of the plant which is standardized and captured by fixed effects, and assume the expected profit only depends on the observable characteristics of each province. Mathematically, the profit of multinational i in province j can be specified as:
Where ij X denotes the vector of observable location characteristics of province j; β is the vector of estimated coefficients which is identical across different multinationals; i  captures the heterogeneities of multinationals; ij  is a random term capturing unobserved characteristics of each alternative and is assumed to be the independently and identically distributed (IID) extreme value. Therefore, a province j is selected by a multinational company i if and only if:
The probability of a multinational i choosing a particular province j out of S potential provinces (alternatives) can be mathematically expressed as follows. The estimation of β can be obtained from the maximum likelihood method. The IIA property specifies that for any investor, the probability ratio of any two alternatives depends only on the attributes of the two alternatives and is independent of other available alternatives. Violation of the IIA assumptions results in inconsistent estimators. To detect the potential violations of the IIA assumption, Hausman and McFadden (1984) and Small and Hsiao (1985) proposed different statistical tests. In order to test the IIA assumption, we will drop the location of Beijing to compare differences between the results by the test of Hausman and McFadden (1984) .
data
According to the current literature, the ideal data used should cover three sets of information: First, a series of variables capturing regional characteristics, such as environmental regulation and so on; Second, the location choice of multinational investment in China; and Third, the measurement of corporate social responsibility of the multinationals. Only the successfully merged data can serve for the purpose of this study.
The dependent variable
Our data on multinational's location choice is sourced from the Fortune Global Their location choice is much less affected by environmental regulation, so that we drop these types of multinational too. Finally, after merging with the database of corporate social responsibility, we are able to get a full sample of 217 multinationals and 6510 observations (217*30). Within the sample, if province i is selected by multinational j for direct investment, the dependent variable equals 1. Otherwise, it equals 0.
Environmental regulation
As mentioned before, the measurement of environmental regulatory stringency is crucial for the research. Environmental regulation reflects one jurisdiction's restriction imposed on emissions and usually makes firms within the jurisdiction increase their pollution disposal costs. Adapting techniques learned from the literature, we employ three measures. The direct measure is generated from the change of the pollution disposal cost. Dasgupta, et al. (1997) show that the pollution levying system is the most widely developed mechanism in the Chinese pollution control regime. Among 
CSR and Interaction terms (ER*CSR)
Our CSR data are sourced from the CSRHUB, which provides social, environmental, community and governance ratings on around 5,000 companies in 65 countries. CSRHUB is the first one combining data from five of the premier socially responsible investment (SRI) analysis firms (also known as Environment, Social, Governance-ESG), and over 120 influential NGOs. Using a proprietary system for mapping and normalizing this broad range of information, CSRHUB provides consistent ratings for the sampled companies with a range between 0 and 100 6 . The higher the rating, the better the performance of corporate social responsibility is.
Considering our research purpose, the environmental CSR rating is specifically adopted here.
Because we use the fixed-effects logit model, CSR cannot be included as an independent variable separately; otherwise it will be dropped out.  and 2  are coefficients to be estimated as well.
If we assume CSR is given for a company, the relationship between location decision (Profit) and ER is hence given as Note that we take logs for the continuous variables in order to control for possible non-linear relationships, which include per capita GDP, aggregated foreign investment, distance to the major ports, length of road, length of railway, and telecommunication infrastructure. The statistical summary of all the independent variables is presented in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 here]
Results
Regression Results
Regression results are shown in Table 2 , which consists of three models adopting different measurement of environmental regulation. Comparing the results of the three models, we find that results are quite consistent regardless of different measures for environmental regulation. We will discuss the results respectively in the following section.
Model 1 adopts the first measure of environmental regulation (ER1): the pollution discharge fee normalized by the regional added value of manufacturing. The coefficient for environmental regulation variable is -0.0978and statistically significant, while the coefficient for the interaction term between environmental regulation and corporate social responsibility is 0.0014 and also statistically significant.
By Equation (5) However, the descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the maximum CSR score for the multinationals in our sample is 76, which is a little above the bifurcation point. Therefore, our result in general supports the pollution haven hypothesis that less stringent environmental regulation is more attractive for multinationals to invest in China particularly for the multinationls with CSR lower than 68. In other words, corporate social responsibility plays significant roles here: The multinationals with higher social responsibility are less likely to be attracted by weak environmental regulation. Particularly, if the CSR higher than 68, the attractiveness of weak environmental regulation disappears. It implies that high social responsibility can counteract attractiveness of less stringency of environmental regulation.
In terms of control variables, such as per capital GDP, labor share, and foreign investment aggregation, the coefficients are all positive and statistically significant, consistent with our expectation. The coefficient of human capital is also positive.
However, it is not significant. The coefficient of regional corruption level is negative and statistically significant, which indicates that high levels of corruption will reduce the possibility of attracting foreign investment. The coefficient of port and railway infrastructure variable are insignificant, while that of road and telecommunication infrastructure variable are positive and significant, which implies that foreign investment does favor regions with better quality of road and telecommunication infrastructure.
[Insert Table 2 Table 2 . The bifurcation point is 86, which is higher than the maximum CSR score. It sufficiently supports our conclusions that the pollution haven hypothesis generally holds in China, and the multinationals with higher social responsibility are less likely to be attracted by weak environmental regulation. In Model 3, the coefficient for environmental regulation is -2.614 and statistically significant, while the interaction term of environmental regulation and social responsibility is 0.0387 and statistically significant as well. The bifurcation point is 67.5, which is slightly lower than the maximum CSR score. It still sufficiently supports our conclusions that the pollution haven hypothesis generally holds in China but corporation social responsibility plays very important roles. The weak environmental regulation can only attract the multinationals with low social responsibility. The multinationals with higher social responsibility are less likely to be attracted by weak environmental regulation. In terms of control variables, the sign and significant level of the coefficients in Model 2 and Model 3 are similar to those of Model 1 in Table2, which support the previous findings.
Robustness check
For political concerns, multinationals could prefer investment in Beijing, the capital of China, which is more influential than other Chinese regions. In this way, the choice of investment in Beijing might be different from choices of investment in other regions. Given this consideration, the regression models are estimated again without the samples in Beijing, which at the same time can verify the IIA assumption. The results are shown in Table 3.The same as Table 2 , model 1, model 2 and model 3 adopts different measure of environmental regulation: ER1, ER2 and ER3 respectively.
In all models, the coefficients for the environmental regulation variable are negative and statistically significant. Meanwhile, the interactions of environmental regulation and corporate social responsibility are positive and mainly statistically significant.
The results of all control variables are similar to those in the full sample. As a whole, the subsample estimation is consistent with the full sample. Considering the limitation of samples in this study, we adopt the bootstrap method, proposed by Efron (1979) . The use of bootstrap can avoid the reliance on the current sample, if the population distribution is unknown and the sample size is limited. The results from 50 bootstraps show that the coefficient of the environmental regulation variable is negative and statistically significant, while the interaction of environmental regulation and corporate social responsibility is still positive and statistically significant, which again confirms our previous findings 8 .
Conclusion
Given the heated debate on the pollution haven hypothesis, the paper takes the lead in examining the relationship between environmental regulation and foreign investment by taking into account the role of corporate social responsibility, with use of conditional logit models and multinational investment data from China. Our results generally support the pollution haven hypothesis that less stringent environmental regulation is more attractive for multinationals to invest in China. However, corporate social responsibility also plays important roles. Particularly, the multinationals with higher social responsibility are less likely to be attracted by weak environmental regulation. Our conclusions are quite robust and consistent, regardless of different measurements of environmental regulation, and different model specifications.
The contribution of this paper is that it sheds new light on the study of the pollution haven hypothesis by introducing the perspective of corporate social responsibility. Previous studies pay considerable attention to the possible competition among developing countries, while the heterogeneity of multinationals has been largely ignored. Taking into account the corporate social responsibility, even though the pollution haven hypothesis generally holds, corporate social responsibility plays significant roles in the relationship between multinationals' location decision and local environmental regulation stringency. High corporate social responsibility usually can counteract the attractiveness of less stringent environmental regulation.
Considering the tremendous impact of multinationals in China, we suggest that China should selectively attract multinationals in order to produce less environmental damage. If the multinationals are environmentally responsible, they will stimulate China's domestic colleagues to imitate their actions. If, however, China aligns itself with multinationals with poor corporate social responsibility records, its environment is highly likely to suffer as a result.
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